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Egypt is an ancient civilization but with a certain geopolitical regularity where agriculture 
and incomes are concerned. Foremost, for over 50 centuries there has been an inexorable 
pressure of a growing population against fixed resources – land and water. Additionally, 
for a very long time, local central rulers and an assortment of foreign powers have used 
control over limited agricultural land as a source of political patronage and “taxation” 
aimed to achieve particular ends. Historically, this has disadvantaged the rural peasantry 
despite periodic infrastructure investments and the introduction of lucrative new crops 
such as Egyptian cotton in 1820. 
This study focuses on the period 1955-2005. In the early part of that era, despite 
an articulation of concern for the rural population, a policy emphasis on industrialization 
and “import substitution” met with mixed success as promotion of industry, tempered 
especially by the 1952 Revolution and ultimately Nasser socialism, reduced incentives to 
both the basic agricultural sector and to international trade. This, in turn, has held 
important implications for the prosperity of the population generally and especially for 
rural incomes in a country where even today one-third of the population is in the 
agricultural sector and more than one-half might be characterized as rural. The period 
since the mid-1980s is characterized by a policy reorientation away from state planning 
and toward reinvigorating the private sector, including agriculture. 
Even though the current policy tendency leans clearly toward embracing markets 
and free enterprise, it is confronted with some burdensome legacies of the past. On the 
one hand, the Government of Egypt (GOE) is openly committed to the goal of increased 
incomes and employment for all Egyptians. To that end, the GOE has actively pursued 
sensible policies of macroeconomic stability, along with a strong commitment to private   3
sector development, privatization of state-owned firms, and legal reforms that affect 
investment. The GOE has also pursued a series of trade barrier reductions, including an 
abolition of most quantitative restrictions and significant reductions in tariffs, especially 
for certain key capital goods, as well as a number of regional and global free trade 
commitments. Although there was some hesitation in policy reform and relative 
economic stagnation from 2000 to 2003, bold reform once again seems to be well on 
track (Srinivasan 2005; IMF 2006). 
However, the legacy of the past is daunting for even well-intentioned policy 
reformers. Historically, by the middle of the 20
th century, a long period of widely 
unpopular European influence had left wealth concentrated in the hands of foreigners and 
a domestic elite.
1 Following the Revolution of 1952, and particularly after the Suez crisis 
of 1956 with its sanctions, the economy was realigned structurally. The state assumed 
ownership of the means of production, and it regulated prices. The public sector soon 
accounted for 75 percent of GDP, and with increased centralized planning came such 
things as directives as to what a certain product should look like and how it should 
perform. At the same time, foreign companies were nationalized, a result of which was 
that inflows of foreign investment virtually ceased. 
In the 1970s, in response to slower growth, the “Open Door” policy began with its 
more outward-looking orientation. Since the 1980s, the pace of economic reform has 
increased, with an emphasis on reliance on markets, increased foreign trade and 
investment and, beginning in the 1990s, privatization. But the history of socialism and 
trade orientation toward Comecon countries has left many with a distrust of markets and 
of foreign trade. Add to this a stifling bureaucracy, and one can appreciate the difficulty 
in advancing deeply needed economic policy reforms. 
Egyptian farmers grow a wide variety of crops – grains, cotton, sugar, berseem 
(clover), legumes, fruits, vegetables – as well as producing meats and dairy products.  
Over the years the agricultural and related sectors have been subject to significant policy 
                                                 
1 Specifically, the period from 1840-1930, following Mohammed Ali’s failed attempts to develop a 
protected industrial economy, was marked by agreements between the European powers and the Sublime 
Porte which underwrote ninety years of almost perfectly free trade. This ended in the period 1930-1950 as 
Egypt gained tariff autonomy and embraced protectionist policies. Additionally, during World War II a 
system of direct controls for distributing food and raw materials, and for regulating prices, was created and 
never fully dismantled after the War. (See Hansen and Nashashibi 1975, and historical references therein.)   4
interventions and large structural changes. For about ten years after the 1952 Revolution, 
agriculture continued to dominate output and employment, and cotton was the main 
export. The sector was driven by close to free market incentives. Since about 1960, 
however, owing somewhat to both direct and indirect policy interventions, agriculture has 
diminished in relative economic importance. Today it contributes only tone-seventh of 
GDP, although agricultural employment remains disproportionately higher at around one-
third. Meanwhile, agricultural exports have declined substantially in importance and 
agricultural imports of the staples wheat and flour have increased dramatically. 
Combined with the politically sensitive policy of substantial bread subsidies to 
consumers, the food policy today represents a large and growing drain on government 
finances that is difficult to sustain. 
As livestock production has become more important, maize has increased in both 
domestic cropping and in imports. Berseem production has expanded as well, while rice 
production, perhaps subsidized more than any other crop by a policy of free irrigation 
water, remains important both for domestic consumption and somewhat as an export. 
Although food security has always been and remains a priority, agricultural 
policies other than for water are largely oriented toward institutionalizing market 
incentives in production and, except for bread and to some extent edible oil and sugar, in 
consumption. This is the reverse of policies of the 1960s and 1970s. In that earlier period, 
policy emphasized the mobilizing of agricultural savings in order to subsidize the urban 
consumer and promote industrialization. In the Nasser era, there was also a technical 
motivation of altering the traditional biennial crop rotation which was believed to be 
harsh on the land. Consequently, market distrust meant virtually all farmers became 
members of cooperatives. The cooperatives, in turn, were run by government 
bureaucracies solely entrusted to provide inputs to and buy outputs from farmers at 
artificially low administered prices.  
The Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit (PBDAC), 
originally established in 1931, became the instrument of allocation for agricultural trade 
and finance. At the same time, some land reforms and rent controls were implemented, 
along with government-dictated cropping patterns. Most social histories recount that the 
system was highly inefficient and somewhat corrupt, probably exploiting the rural   5
peasantry to the benefit of a controlling class at the village level of “rural notables.” 
Certainly agriculture generally was extremely repressed. Even relatively freely traded 
agricultural products – livestock, certain animal feeds, and some horticulture –suffered 
from high industrial trade protection and an overvalued currency. 
Important market-oriented reforms began in 1986, the terminal year in the case 
study by Dethier in Krueger, Schiff and Valdez (1991), and by 1994 the private sector 
was substantially enfranchised once again. Egypt by 2006 had engineered a remarkable, 
almost unprecedented, reversal of its agricultural policies. Nonetheless, as we report 
below, some indirect disincentives to the agricultural sector remain, and the sugar sector 
continues to be the purview of the GOE. Also, food consumer policy, particularly 
untargeted bread subsidies, remains problematic. 
The remainder of this study attempts to amplify the policy discussion and to 
quantify its impacts on incentives. The study first provides a brief history of growth and 
structural changes in the Egyptian economy over the past 50 years. It then recounts the 
evolution of agricultural policy since 1955 before providing measures of the extent of 
distortions to incentives. An analytical narrative of policy evolution is followed by some 




Growth and structural change in the Egyptian economy: 1955 to 2005 
 
 
Egypt’s economy has grown unevenly over the past 50 years, driven by population 
growth as much as investment, and structurally impacted by significant policy swings. 
The period is marked first by the rapid nationalization of industry and the move toward 
“import substitution” and central planning, and then by the equally rapid reorientation of 
the economy toward reliance on markets, private property, and integration into the world 
economy. These policy swings have applied to both the agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors, although the emphasis on heavier industry in the early years clearly penalized 
agriculture indirectly. Also, in the reform period, import substitution policies and tariff   6
escalation have been dismantled more slowly relative to the pace of other reforms, so 
some bias against agriculture continues. 
Demographically, the population grew from about 25 million to around 75 million 
over the time period. The bulk of that growth was in the non-agricultural population, 
rising from 30 percent to over 60 percent, although the “rural population” actually stayed 
proportionately constant at more than one-half. 
 The trend is reflected in the labor markets where the labor force grew from 6 
million to 20 million, but agricultural labor fell as a proportion from over half to just one-
third. With such rapid population growth, the population is demographically quite young, 
posing a challenge for the economy to absorb the burgeoning cohort of new entrants into 
the labor force. 
Overall, GDP and especially GDP per capita have grown somewhat haltingly. 
Meanwhile, agriculture has fallen from 30 percent of GDP to about 14 percent, and 
manufacturing has grown to more than the size of the agricultural sector. The remainder 
of GDP is comprised of oil and gas, plus government and other services. The composition 
of primary agriculture by product over time for the 70 percent of products covered in this 
study (at current distorted prices) is shown in Figure 1, where the contraction of the 
cotton sector and growing importance of livestock and horticulture are evident. 
Export and import trends have been in secular decline. Except for a few 
commodities – cotton in the early period, gas and oil, Suez Canal services, garments, and 
tourism in the later years – Egypt essentially disengaged from international commerce. 
As a share of GDP, merchandise exports have fallen from an average of over 10 percent 
prior to the 1990s to about 5 percent since the early 1990s. For imports the comparable 
shares are 27 percent and 16 percent (WDI 2006). Egypt’s share of world trade was 
substantially larger in 1975 than it is today. Imports remain few and exports plus imports 
as a share of GDP has fallen, raising the spectre that economic reform has been somewhat 
anti-trade biased in that dismantling the import-substitution policy of yesteryear has 
received lower priority. Foreign exchange earnings still rely significantly on repatriated 
wages by Egyptians working abroad and on foreign aid. Foreign investment, which was 
all but frozen in the early years, remains fairly low relative to other developing countries,   7
and some of it is driven by “tariff jumping” into heavily protected industrial sectors of the 
economy (Nathan Associates 2002). 
The commodity composition of trade has changed considerably over the period. 
Agricultural products, mostly cotton, no longer dominate exports, while gas and oil 
(“other primary exports”) have increased substantially since the return of the Sinai oil 
fields after the 1973 war. Imports continue to be mostly manufactures, particularly capital 
goods and especially oil-industry related, but food imports – especially wheat and flour – 
still represent 20 percent of merchandise imports despite a concerted effort to decontrol 
farm-gate prices and achieve self-sufficiency in flour for bread production. 
The foreign trade sector notoriously reflects a substantial anti-trade bias owing to 
a host of direct and indirect policy interventions, most notably significant tariff and non-
tariff trade barriers escalating in favor of industry, and an overvalued exchange rate for 
most of the period until about 1997 (Nassar and Aziz 2000). In the late 1990s, 
agricultural production was penalized by much higher levels of protection for 
manufacturing (Appendix Table 1), and this was amplified by non-tariff  barriers such as 
“red tape” costs of importing and a restrictive system of standards and quality control 
(Nathan Associates 1996, 1998). 
In the past decade, tariff and trade reform appears to have had little impact on the 
extent of tariff escalation between primary agriculture and processed food, and the tariff 
decline for primary agriculture, from 4.6 percent in 1995 to 1.9 percent in 2005, has 
widened the gap between it and tariff protection for non-agricultural primary sectors 
which has remained steady at over 10 percent on average (UNCTAD-TRAINS 2006). 
The exchange rate appeared to be overvalued in the 1960s and 1970s, since it was 
well below the black market rate, but devaluations in the late 1970s, the late 1980s and 
during the current decade have corrected its misalignment periodically (Appendix 
Figure2). The inflation rate varied, but exceeded 10 – 15 percent for much of the 1970s 
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Economic performance is tied to events and to policy. From 1950 to 1952, the annual rate 
of GDP growth was 7-8 percent (Al-Sayyid 2003). However, after the Revolution of 
1952 the growth rate declined sharply until 1955 and then there was a slow recovery in 
1955-1956 (Mabro 1974). This was also a period of political instability and, despite some 
effort to attract foreign capital, low foreign investment. Income and wealth were highly 
skewed: 1 percent of the farm population received 39 percent of total agricultural income, 
while the 80 percent that comprise landless and poor peasants received just 29 percent of 
agricultural income (Abdel-Fadil 1975, 1981). In the urban areas, the poorest 60 percent 
of the population received 18 percent of total personal income while the top 1 percent 
received 11 percent. 
From 1956 until about 1966, the economy was marked by a rapid swing toward 
state socialism. While the Organization of Free Officers that took power in 1953 had no 
strong unanimously held views on economic policy, other than for “social justice” and 
land reform, the genesis of the policy shift resided in the political events that shifted 
Egyptian trade from West to East (Nutting 1972; Hansen and Nashashibi 1975).
2 The 
public sector expanded and came to dominate the economy with a large number of public 
enterprises. A period of agrarian reform reduced maximum landholding to 100 acres per 
family and saw the beginning of state planning and procurement policies for most of the 
major crops. Growth was actually fairly high in this period, about 8-12 percent (Al-
Sayyid 2003), but central planning was beginning to show strains.  
The period between 1967 and 1973 began and ended with wars. Economic growth 
slowed to 3.1 percent following defeat in the June War of 1967, when emphasis was put 
on industrialization and the maximum farm landholding was lowered in 1969 to fifty 
acres per family. 
From 1975 until the early 1980s, the Egyptian economy grew at about 6 percent 
per year. But much of this performance was due to one-off factors such as the return of 
oil fields after the 1973 war, the rise in oil prices in 1973 and 1979, increased use of the 
                                                 
2 These events included the Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms deal of 1955, relations with the U.S. concerning 
the World Bank Aswan High Dam loan, the Suez Canal nationalization, the British-French-Israeli 
aggression and the Suez War, and the subsequent foreign exchange and trade blockade by the U.S., Britain, 
and France.   9
Suez Canal, inflows of remittances from expatriate workers, and the rapid infusion of 
external assistance. Savings were low, non-oil manufactured exports were almost non-
existent, public firms dominated the industrial sector, and there was crumbling 
infrastructure along with low investment (Ikram 2006). 
The sharp fall in oil prices in 1982 made the weaknesses apparent and by 1991 the 
situation was untenable: the budget deficit was 20 percent of GDP, inflation was almost 
15 percent and rising, real interest rates were negative, and external debt was rising as 
foreign exchange reserves dwindled. At this point, the GOE began to develop a fairly 
sound macroeconomic environment, such that by 1998 inflation was 3.8 percent, real 
interest rates were positive, external reserves were much higher, and external debt was 
manageable. 
Also, significant structural reforms began as some public firms were privatized, a 
trend which accelerated after 1996. The financial sector was liberalized a little, including 
through passing a law that allowed private sector ownership. There were some trade 
reforms too, although tariff and non-tariff barriers remain relatively high and tariff 
escalation increased. Some attention also was paid to widespread human resource 
development needs, in the hopes of alleviating poverty. 
The results of the reforms have been mixed but, from a historical perspective, 
there has been substantial progress toward developing a market oriented, outward-
looking economy. 
From the early 1960s until the mid-1980s the agricultural share of GDP and 
employment declined significantly, even though absolute employment and population 
numbers in rural areas remained high so that the proportions were still 34 percent and 50 
percent, respectively. The relative stagnation of the sector was mainly due to government 
intervention in agricultural production, marketing, and pricing (Siam 2005). 
Administered prices were far below border prices, representing a heavy “tax” on the 
sector, as the central government sought to transfer the agricultural surplus to finance the 
development of the non-agricultural sectors. Confronted with low profitability in 
agriculture, land productivity declined and labor began to migrate out of agriculture to 
non-agricultural job opportunities both in Egypt and abroad, for example in Iraq, Gulf 
countries and Libya.   10
These interventionist farm policies began to be reversed in 1986, when the GOE 
took action to transform the economy gradually by reducing its role and increasing the 
role of the private sector, with the objective of increasing the efficiency of the use of 
agriculture resources in particular and economic resources generally. This was achieved 
through two stages. The first period (1986-1990) focused on direct distortions in 
agriculture. It involved complete or partial liberalization for the prices of ten main crops; 
reduction or elimination of the obligatory deliveries of the strategic crops; cuts in 
subsidies on farm inputs; elimination of the government monopoly on major farm inputs 
and strategic crops; and expansion of the market for private investment. 
The second stage (1990-1997) addressed indirect distortions affecting agriculture 
by implementing the general macroeconomic reforms discussed above, including a free 
market determined exchange rate and some liberalization of foreign trade. 
All of this affected agricultural output and agricultural trade. Historically, cotton lint 
dominated Egyptian exports, representing nearly 80 percent of all commodity exports in 
the early 1960s. Rice has been the other significant agricultural export. However, both 
items have fallen in importance relative to total commodity exports – now dominated by 
oil and gas – as well as relative to other agricultural exports, notably horticulture 
(Appendix Figure 3(a)). 
Agricultural imports also were affected. As shown in Appendix Figure 3(b), 
imports of maize, sugar, and especially wheat have represented nearly half of all 
commodity imports throughout the period studied. Maize has grown in importance, 
reflecting the expansion of domestic livestock industries. Wheat and flour remain 
substantial imports despite considerable recent policy efforts to encourage domestic 
wheat production and a publicly articulated, if somewhat unrealistic, goal of wheat self-
sufficiency. 
These imports are in turn integrally related to the long-standing and politically 
sensitive policy of substantial bread (baladi) subsidies to all consumers. Throughout most 
of the study period, bread has been sold on the street at 20-30 percent of its border price 
equivalent. Since a government procurement subsidy accounts for the difference, and 
since bread is a staple in the Egyptian diet with consumption of almost half a kilo per 
capita per day, the food policy has become a significant drain on government revenues   11
representing nearly 2 percent of GDP. Some sugar and cooking oil is also substantially 
subsidized in consumption, but these are subject to rationing. 
In the next section, measures of the magnitude of the distortions for five major 
crops plus meat and dairy are summarized. That is followed by a discussion of the 
specific policies and policy motivations by commodity. 
 
 
Measures of distortions to agricultural incentives, 1955 to 2005 
 
 
Using the methodology of the project (Anderson et al. 2008), we quantify the extent of 
direct and indirect distortions affecting the agricultural sector in Egypt. The main focus is 
on government-imposed distortions that create a gap between domestic prices and what 
they would be under free markets. Since it is not possible to understand the 
characteristics of agricultural development with a sectoral view alone, the project’s 
methodology not only estimates the effects of direct agricultural policy measures 
(including distortions in the foreign exchange market), but it also generates estimates of 
distortions in non-agricultural sectors for comparative evaluation.
  
More specifically, this study computes a Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) for 
farmers including an adjustment for direct interventions on inputs. It also generates an 
NRA for nonagricultural tradables, for comparison with that for agricultural tradables via 
the calculation of a Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA – see Anderson et al. 2008).  
  The analysis considers five import-competing products (maize, sugar wheat, meat 
and milk) and two exported crops (cotton and rice). These products constitute around 70 
percent of primary agricultural output. For sugar, rice and cotton, we also report on both 
the primary commodity (cane sugar, paddy rice, and seed cotton) as well as the lightly 
processed derivatives.  We have not focused specifically on berseem, which is an 
important feed input for livestock but is rarely traded, nor on horticulture which consists 
of essentially undistorted commodities. 
 
Nominal rates of assistance and consumer tax equivalents   12
 
As noted above, the NRA measures can include policy-induced input price changes. 
While some inputs have been subsidized in Egypt – especially water, fertilizer, and pest 
control – we have mostly ignored this channel of assistance. Thus our NRA estimates are 
mostly NRAs on output.  
  Table 1 summarizes the NRA for all of the commodities while Figure  2 shows 
the NRA by trade status. Trends were roughly similar for all of the commodities. In 
particular, all of the crops were penalized substantially in the early part of the study 
period, and this reversed in the mid-1980s. This is consistent with the earlier study by 
Dethier (1991) who recorded negative rates of direct and exchange rate assistance on the 
order of -30 percent to -40 percent for wheat and maize from 1964 to 1985, and -60 
percent or more for rice and cotton. Dethier reports only modestly negative to no 
assistance for sugar cane when the calculation is relevant using his methodology. 
By about 1986, the NRAs turn positive, and then suddenly spike in the mid-
1980s. This reflects the GOE attempt to reinvigorate agriculture and an overshooting as 
administered prices were adjusted substantially upwards, and tied to a lagging moving 
average, just as world prices fell dramatically in 1986. Indeed, 1986 was the last year of 
area restrictions, quotas and low fixed procurement prices for wheat and maize. Private 
sector imports were allowed in 1991-92. Cotton procurement prices were gradually 
increased from 1986 to 1991 to more closely reflect border prices, and were deregulated 
after that. Furthermore, the exchange rate regime was liberalized substantially in this 
period and the black market premium disappeared as rates were market determined. 
Rice and sugar reflect trends similar to the other commodities, including the spike 
in the 1985-89 period, although neither product was deregulated until later. Sugar 
production was never fully deregulated and remains a government enterprise at the 
milling level, while rice was not really liberalized until 1991.  
Table 1 also reports NRAs milk and beef, neither of which is much traded 
although we still categorize them as importable. Livestock was largely unregulated but 
beef production was protected with a 100 percent import tariff, and very restrictive health 
standards applied to imports for some years. Our calculations suggest that both products 
follow the NRA patterns of the five crops, although beef in particular seems to have   13
experienced few disincentives since the early 1970s.  This is consistent with the trends 
reported in the 1970s and 1980s as livestock expanded fairly steadily until feed – maize 
and berseem – became an input constraint. Note that while the mean NRA has 
approached zero, the standard deviation of NRAs has increased over time (bottom of 
Table 1). Consequently the welfare cost of agricultural programs may have remained 
high, possibly may even have risen, because of the intra-sectoral variance in covered 
NRAs. 
Since it is mostly trade measures that generate the NRAs, the distortions of the 
consumer side of the market is similar. This can be seen from the estimates of the average 
consumer tax equivalent (CTE) across covered products, shown near the bottom of Table 
1. Wheat flour receives a very heavy consumer subsidy in addition, with its price being as 
low as one-fifth the border price in the 1960s (final row of Table 1).  
We assume non-covered farm products face no distortions to their prices, since 
they are mostly horticultural products that are not subjected to government policy 
interventions. Including them therefore reduces the overall average NRA for the 
agricultural sector, as shown in the top rows of Table 2. We have no estimates of 
assistance that is not product specific. 
 
Relative rate of assistance  
 
The Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) seeks to take into account the effects on farmer 
incentives of policy induced price changes in non-agricultural sectors. It does so by 
comparing the NRAs for just the tradable parts of agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors. The NRA for the non-agricultural sector is assumed to be a constant 28 percent 
average import tariff equivalent throughout the period. All manufactures are assumed to 
be import competing and “other primary exports” are assumed to represent non-farm 
exportables. For early missing data years we simply assumed that nothing had changed 
from the closest available year, which was 1960. These calculations yield a fairly stable 
time series for non-agricultural (weighted) assistance and hovers around 4 percent to 6 
percent after 1975 except for a couple of outlier years. Consequently, since the non-
agricultural sector was favored by import protection and an overvalued exchange rate   14
over the study period, the RRA estimates are slightly below the NRA estimates for 
agricultural tradables (Table 2). 
   One picture that emerges is that, while agriculture was repressed until about the 
mid-1980s, the degree of negative bias appears to have lightened or even reversed since 
that time. Typically, import-competing industries fare better than exportables. This is 
consistent with other studies such as Fletcher (1996), Ender and Holtzman (2003) and 
Bautista, Robinson et al. (1998), who find that whatever biases against primary 
agriculture existed earlier, these biases seem to have largely disappeared after the mid-
1980s. The similarities between the NRA and RRA calculations suggest that the trends 
owe more to reversal of low procurement prices and exchange rate misalignment than to 
the import substitution policies favoring non-primary agriculture and manufacturing.  
In calculating the experience of each product using the Methodology of the 
project we have assumed that one-half of foreign exchange was converted at the parallel 
rate when the official rate seemed overvalued. This is consistent with Al-Sayyid (2003), 
who reports a flourishing “gray market” during the period of the 1960s and 1970s when 
the exchange rate premiums were most pronounced. We use the black market premiums 
as reported in Cowitt (various years) to calculate the parallel exchange rates. The impact 
those exchange rate distortions have on the NRA and RRA estimates is relatively minor 
except in the 1960s, as shown in the bottom of Table 2. 
 
 
Evolution of specific policy choices and their impacts  
 
 
In this section, we focus on the policy choices of the GOE, especially with respect to 
agriculture and food policy, but mindful that certain industrial and exchange rate policies 
had profound indirect effects on agriculture. The main indirect policy effects were 
engendered by trade protection and direct subsidies to non-agricultural industries, 
especially heavier manufacturing industries, and by an overvalued exchange rate. By the 
1990s, high and escalating tariffs along with some non-tariff barriers (e.g. “standards”) 
for manufacturing were the main remaining indirect disincentives to agriculture.   15
As recounted earlier, while widespread planning characterized much of the 
economy from about 1956 until the mid-1980s, the retreat from markets was 
operationally less pronounced in agriculture until the 1960s. But by 1964, central 
planning, mandatory cooperative membership, and administered prices for the major 
crops were in place. Consequently, we focus here on developments during a period of 
regulation, 1964-1986, although briefly as they are surveyed extensively in Dethier 
(1991), and on the subsequent period of deregulation, 1987-2005, characterized by a turn 
back toward market incentives. We begin with an overview, and then turn to some 
product-specific issues, food subsidies, and rural income. We relate our narrative to the 




The period 1964 to 1986 
The policy objectives early on were aimed to promote the equitable distribution of food 
and income in Egypt, and to finance industrial growth through the provision of 
inexpensive food to urban consumers. The context was a vision of a grand coalition 
between the factory worker and the rural peasantry. Also, “Arab socialism” and a 
widespread distrust of markets, rooted in the 1952 Revolution and Suez Crisis of 1956, 
had become pervasive. 
In order to achieve these objectives, the core of agricultural policy involved 
imposed crop rotation schedules and crop area allocations, a compulsory delivery quota 
for crops at fixed prices that were substantially lower than international prices, and 
subsidized consumer prices for basic food commodities. As we report below, while 
setting prices and quantities (acreages) independently need not necessarily be inconsistent 
with one another, nonetheless as implemented they were as it turned out. 
Institutionally, agricultural cooperatives were created in each village to control 
production and marketing of major crops. Cooperatives, in turn, provided agricultural 
inputs to farmers, imposed crop rotation schedules, procured the crop quotas, and 
ultimately marketed the major crops. The Principal Bank for Development and   16
Agricultural Credit (PBDAC) was reconstituted to work along with the cooperatives in 
providing credit to farmers and receiving their output quotas. 
In effect, and mixed with substantial planning in the non-agricultural sector along 
with an overvalued exchange rate aimed to conserve on foreign exchange resources, the 
policy performed poorly. The government intervention in production and marketing 
created many inefficiencies and distorted choices among competing crops.
3 The 
overvalued exchange rate and artificially low producer prices eventually suppressed 
agricultural production and led to stagnation of the agricultural sector. The extent of the 
disincentives to agriculture is clear in Table 1: for the five crops studied and milk, the 
NRA is almost uniformly and substantially negative throughout the period. Beef appears 
to have been mildly favored in this era. 
These disincentives to farm production ultimately frustrated the original policy 
objectives. Yields fell, cropping patterns were distorted, and cotton exports declined. The 
food gap widened by the mid-1980s, despite some initial closing, and “self-sufficiency” 
in wheat declined to its lowest level as imports rose. The food subsidy system imposed a 
heavy burden on the budget and foreign exchange reserves, thus frustrating plans to 
support industrialization and conserve foreign currency. Furthermore, instead of 
achieving “a more equitable distribution of income,” farm incomes declined initially due 
to the heavy implicit taxation reflected in artificially low producer prices, exacerbating 
the urban rural income gap. However, as rural incomes declined, the political hostility of 
the rural classes toward the government increased. That elicited the political response not 
of reduced government intervention but rather of increased farm input subsidies and an 
extension of food subsidies to rural areas in the late 1970s (Dethier 1991). Also, land 
ownership was arguably redistributed more equitably through land reform laws. 
 
The period 1987 to 2005 
Ostensibly, the policy objectives of this subsequent period were very similar to the 
previous period, but with the addition of redressing the budgetary and foreign exchange 
pressures created by the earlier policy. Specifically, the Agricultural Reform Program 
                                                 
3 Hansen and Nashashibi (1975) observe that planning per se need not distort acreage choices of farmers 
nor necessarily lead to suboptimal cropping patterns, but it did, according to their methodology.   17
(ARP) of this era aimed to provide an adequate supply of food to all income groups, to 
promote greater self-sufficiency in crop production, to increase farm income, to conserve 
foreign exchange, and to bring the budget deficit under control (Kherallah 2000). 
In fact, the policy pursued was essentially one of dismantling central planning and 
restoring market incentives. As recounted above, the planning approach was failing and 
had become a political liability. The policy measures implemented under the ARP 
consisted of two phases. In the first phase, prices, quotas, some crop restrictions, and 
marketing controls were partially liberalized for ten crops. The compulsory delivery 
program was eliminated for all crops and replaced with an optional program for a number 
of crops – namely, wheat, maize, and rice. Moreover, the procurement prices were 
replaced by floor prices, often tied to a moving average of lagging prices. It is this last 
feature that accounts for the positive NRA spikes 1986-87 in Figure 2 as floor prices 
were set generously just as world prices were falling. The volatility in the NRA caused by 
domestic prices being anchored to an average of lagging prices is consistent with the 
finding by Baffes and Gardner (2003) that world price fluctuations over time were only 
incompletely transmitted to domestic markets in Egypt.
4 
The second phase of the reform coincided with the launching of the Economic 
Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) in 1991. With the assistance of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, this program sought to shift Egypt 
from a state-controlled economy toward a more efficient, market-oriented economy. In 
this phase, cotton marketing was liberalized and all remaining input subsidies were 
eliminated. Also, the private sector was encouraged to play a greater role in agricultural 
trading. By 1997, the land rental relationship was liberalized as well. 
Our measures of NRA and RRA indicate a policy impact as the direct 
disincentives to agriculture seem to have been reduced or eliminated, although as noted 
earlier the welfare implications are less clear as the variance of the NRA has increased. 
Protection for non-agricultural industry and processed foods remains, but is not large 
when weighted by production. Also, in terms of production response, yields generally 
rose and cropping patterns were rationalized (Saad et al. 1996, Ender and Holtzman 
                                                 
4 There is also an aberration in our exchange rate series owing to a black market rate outlier in 1985.  We 
have experimented with smoothing out this aberration and found that it is of little consequence to the NRA 
spike observed around this time. Price trends are the drivers.   18
2003). On the other hand, while farm-gate prices have risen, the enactment of a market 
oriented land policy has resulted in some tenants who previously benefited from 
controlled, artificially low, land values becoming landless. 
 
Crop-specific and other farm policies 
 
Cotton 
For over a century, cotton has been an important traditional crop, dominating area 
planted, value of production, importance to downstream industry, and exports. The sector 
was nationalized in the 1960s, and low administered procurement prices, along with 
many other interventions, were used to divert revenues to the GOE. This policy is clearly 
reflected in the large negative NRA estimates for cotton (Table 1), particularly before 
1987, although the cotton sector was again taxed heavily in the early 1990s (Saad et al. 
1996). 
In consequence, total area planted in cotton declined by about half from 1980 to 
2000. This contraction due to low profitability was exacerbated by rising wages in the 
1970s and 1980s, since cotton is one of the most labor intensive of the major crops.
5 The 
land was instead planted with cereals, especially wheat and rice. This is consistent with 
our estimates of the relative NRAs as both wheat and rice assistance turned from 
substantially negative to mildly positive after the mid-1980s (Table 1). Also, horticulture 
expanded somewhat and berseem became quite profitable as the livestock sector 
flourished (Figure 1). 
Confronted with the demise of a profitable industry, the GOE reversed course in 
the 1990s. In1992 procurement prices were increased to 66 percent of a five-year moving 
average of world prices. This policy accounts for both the upward trend and the sharp 
swings in our NRA estimates after 1991 as world prices fluctuated yearly. In 1994 
administered prices were changed to floor prices, although the GOE did limit exports in 
1995 to satisfy the needs of local mills, and in 1996 the floor prices actually exceeded the 
border prices.  
                                                 
5 In an earlier period, cotton production area had been restricted to reduce the supply of Egyptian long-
staple cotton on world markets which were dominated by Egypt’s exports at that time (but this was not the 
case in the more recent times discussed above).   19
In 1997 prices became market determined and the sector was essentially 
completely liberalized. Nonetheless, the NRA for cotton remained negative and, until 
quite recently, substantially so. The negative NRA reflects domestic prices which, 
although rising, still lagged border prices as the Egyptian pound depreciated sharply 
against the US dollar from 2.156 in 1991 to 3.41 in 1997 and 6.15 in 2004. Apparently 
the exchange rate changes are reflected more slowly in prices closer to the farm or, 
possibly, captured somewhere in shipping and processing along the value chain between 
farm and port. 
 
Rice 
Rice, along with cotton, is still exported. Since the 1960s the GOE has intervened 
actively in the rice supply chain with low administered prices, government procurement, 
an export monopoly, and extensive public sector mills. In the 1960s and 1970s, while 
both processed and primary production confronted disincentives, paddy rice was more 
penalized and this allowed the mills, and traders, to garner profits somewhat at the 
expense of the farmer. Our calculations show that this relative disadvantage disappeared 
in the 1980s. In any case, the relative price advantage of rice over more-penalized cotton, 
and perhaps the relatively higher subsidy value of the free water policy to a water-
intensive crop, resulted in continued expansion of rice acreage as cotton contracted. Also, 
rice expansion has been further encouraged by incentives to wheat since the two crops are 
complementary in the crop rotation. 
  In the 1990s, rice production was substantially liberalized and crop area, yield, 
and production grew by 4-5 percent. Nominal prices to farmers doubled, and paddy rice 
actually received positive to only mildly negative assistance. Rice farm prices rose so 
much at one point that milling and exporting became unprofitable and the GOE enacted 
export subsidies of LE 100 - 200 to aid the (mostly government owned) milling sector. 
As with cotton, the negative NRAs since the early 1990s reflect rising domestic prices 
that nonetheless lag behind border prices which were rising rapidly in domestic currency 
terms due to the sharp currency depreciation. 
It has been noted by a number of commentators that GOE rice policy is often in 
conflict with itself. Crop choice has been liberalized, yet rice growing area is still   20
restricted. Similarly, while area is restricted in order to conserve on water usage, exports 
are periodically subsidized. 
 
Maize 
Maize, an import-competing industry, competes for area with rice and cotton, as well as 
some other summer crops. From the 1960s maize was regulated through mandatory 
cropping, delivery quotas, and administered prices. This resulted in very negative NRA 
throughout the 1960s and much of the 1970s. Low prices for yellow maize were passed 
on as feed subsidies until 1987,
6 when the sector was liberalized and procurement prices 
were raised to encourage production, consistent with the GOE renewed interest in food 
self-sufficiency and the growth of the livestock industry. The production area has 
expanded largely by displacing cotton and in the present decade has represented about 15 
percent of the cropping area. 
Politically, maize policy has become more entwined with food policy. Foremost, 
yellow maize is an important input into the expanding livestock sector which in turn is 
stimulated by the growing Egyptian demand for red meat. Also, in an effort to reduce 
wheat imports, which have risen to produce subsidized baladi bread, the GOE has 
experimented with substituting maize flour for wheat flour. Since maize flour is cheaper, 
the cost of producing bread is thereby reduced and, along with it, the government cost of 
the bread subsidy. 
 
Sugar 
Sugar processing is directed by a government owned company, the Egyptian Sugar and 
Refining Company. Prices are administered, and procurement is handled through 
contracts between producers and the government company. Sugar consumption, which 
for a long time has been a part of the food subsidy policy, is still partially subsidized 
through price-discounted ration cards distributed to nearly two-thirds of the population. 
Because of the consumer subsidies, providing higher prices to growers has a negative 
impact on the government budget. Also, inefficiencies in milling, and so higher costs, 
                                                 
6 Also, until 1965, prices and regulations were undoubtedly influenced by the US PL480 program which 
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make it difficult for the government to raise the farmgate prices of sugar cane and beet 
(the latter representing about one-quarter of sugar production). Nonetheless, we calculate 




Wheat is the primary input into the most important staple food in Egypt, bread, which is 
consumed in enormous quantities, heavily subsidized, and at the heart of a politically 
charged food subsidy policy. Prior to 1955, the GOE slowly began to tighten its control 
over the production and trading of wheat. The explicit objective was equitable 
distribution of food and income, and the provision of inexpensive food for urban 
consumers aimed to finance industrial growth (Kherallah 2004). In 1955, the GOE 
reduced the area allocation requirement for wheat production to 33 percent of agricultural 
land holdings, and at the same time initiated a compulsory delivery policy whereby each 
farmer had to sell a specific quota of wheat – between 1 and 3 ardeb per feddan – at a 
fixed price that was lower than the international price. By the 1960s wheat, along with 
the other cereals, was subjected to mandatory delivery quotas, low administered prices, 
and other marketing regulations. As Table 1 shows, the NRA for wheat was substantially 
negative until about 1987, although it increased in the late 1970s which reflects the 
replacement of the compulsory delivery requirement with an optional delivery program in 
1976.
7 In 1960, Egypt began to import wheat for the first time in its history, and has 
imported it ever since. Before 1965, imports were further encouraged by US PL480, 
which made available credit subsidies for wheat imports from the United States. 
During the reform period, after 1987, the GOE offered floor prices announced at 
planting time which were set to approximate or exceed international prices. For example, 
in 2005 the procurement price for wheat from farmers, at LE 1165, was about 11 percent 
higher than the price of French wheat adjusted for shipping costs. Since the GOE 
procured 2 million tons locally at this price, this represents support payments on the order 
of LE 220 million, or about 3 percent of the total value of wheat production. As with the 
other cereals, there was some overshooting in the late 1980s as floor prices exceeded 
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international prices, but the NRA generally turned neutral to positive after that. Wheat 
production expanded and yields rose as well. Nonetheless, since the early 1980s, the self-
sufficiency ratio has never been above 55 percent of total consumption, making Egypt 
one of the top four wheat importers in the world. 
 
Livestock  
Egypt has a significant stock of animals yielding meat and milk. (Buffalo are also a 
source of power on the farm.) Since there is little permanent pastureland, animals feed on 
berseem, corn, barley and wheat, thus competing with human consumption. The livestock 
population grew steadily after 1952, stimulated by a NRA of 100 percent and rising 
demand, and stabilized during the 1980s as feed became less available. Water buffalo is 
the primary source of milk on farms, supplemented by a commercial dairy herd of mainly 
Holstein cattle. In addition to buffalo and cattle, farmers raise poultry, sheep and, in 
diminishing quantities, camels. Pigs are less important since pork is not widely 
consumed, for religious reasons. 
 
Input policies 
Prior to the reform era of the mid-1980s, the GOE through the PBDAC monopolized 
farm inputs and distributed many inputs from seed to fertilizer administratively, including 
rationing based on technical information from the Ministry of Agriculture and Land 
Reclamation, and at subsidized prices. The subsidies fell mainly on chemical fertilizers, 
pesticides, seeds, and animal feed. Under the ERSAP reform package, the monopoly was 
eliminated and private investment was allowed to compete with the PBDAC, although 
there was a two-year reversion to the old system for fertilizer during the 1995 “fertilizer 
crisis.” Today, private firms dominate the fertilizer industry, for example, accounting for 
75 percent of nitrogen fertilizer and all of phosphorus chemical fertilizer (Saad 2003). 
The private sector was also allowed to import, export, and distribute farm inputs. 
Pesticides are still controlled by the GOE for cotton, however. Between 1990 and 1997, 
virtually all of the input subsidies were eliminated and input prices now approximate   23
international prices. Import taxes on fertilizer, prominent in the 1970s to protect some 
domestic producers, do not exceed 2 percent now.
8  
The Nile River almost defines Egypt, and water policy is viewed as critical. There 
have long been common elements to the policy which have not changed over the study 
period, or for that matter many centuries, and are commonly viewed as the purview of 
government. These include minimizing water loss (modern irrigation methods, improved 
navigational paths, new approaches to canal maintenance and weed control, efficient use 
of ground water, water recovery, and so on) and various programs for cost sharing 
(currently through Water Users’ Associations which are locally based). Also, of course, 
the Aswan High Dam came on line during the study period. In effect, the marginal cost of 
water to farmers is zero. This has resulted in expansion of water-intensive crops – rice, 
bananas and sugar cane – relative to what otherwise might have been. This might help 
explain how rice can remain a viable farm industry despite the negative NRA shown in 
Table 1. Note, however, that any water subsidy works to the relative disadvantage of 
cotton in choosing acreage allotment (Hansen and Nashashibi 1975). 
Land policy has evolved from an initially highly political issue that is integrally 
related to rural incomes. In 1952, the GOE announced that land reform would be a 
centerpiece of rural income equity policy. Over the ensuing years, land ownership was 
limited to 50 feddans, and about 12 percent of cultivated area was distributed to 341,000 
families which were previously tenants. Over the years the number of small holders 
owning five feddans or fewer has increased substantially, suggesting continued land 
fragmentation. By the end of the 1990s, the average size of a holding was less than two 
feddans. In 1990, about two-thirds of the total land area was owned and cultivated by 
landlords (with family and/or hired workers) and only about 10 percent was rented for 
cash or sharecropped (Siam 2006). 
 
Food consumer policy 
 
It is impossible to divorce agricultural reform in Egypt from food policy, or food policy 
from real incomes. Historically, food consumer subsidies and food security have been 
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pursued in Egypt for over ten centuries, and state granaries have existed since Pharaonic 
times (Scobie 1981). There is a very deeply ingrained mindset in the general population 
that government is mandated to ensure affordable food and, since the Nasser era, the state 
has explicitly pursued that mandate (Khouri-Dager 1996). Indeed, Singerman (1995) 
argues that the government policy of political exclusion has paralleled its commitment to 
provide the basic needs of the population, thereby maintaining its legitimacy. Thus, food 
consumer subsidies, especially for baladi bread and flour, are viewed as central to 
political stability, and the food riots of 1977, after staples prices were increased, still 
serves as a reminder for caution in policy reform. However, as is recognized by the GOE, 
a policy aimed to simultaneously subsidize food consumption, raise farm-gate prices to 
encourage production and reduce imports, and still maintain a credible budget balance to 
pursue other development goals, is inherently inconsistent. 
Specifically, while rationing and subsidies for sugar, edible oil, sometimes wheat, 
and some other products were in place before 1952, after the Revolution, and particularly 
in the 1960s and 1970s, the program expanded greatly to encompass 18 foods including 
beans, lentils, frozen fish, red meat, chicken, rice and yellow maize. There was some 
rationing, but baladi bread, in particular, was not rationed and was heavily subsidized to 
the general public through the mechanism of subsidizing the wheat input to the bakeries. 
As self-sufficiency in wheat became elusive, and after 1960 as imports grew, this 
subsidy, along with the others, became a substantial drain on the budget. 
After the 1976 attempt to cut subsidies generally met with violent public 
resistance, a more gradual approach was invoked. The number of subsidized foods was 
reduced, subsidy levels were decreased, and ration card distribution became stricter. 
Currently, sugar, edible oil, baladi bread and flour continue to be subsidized. Sugar and 
oil are rationed and arguably manageable. Bread, however, is still not rationed and it has 
been estimated that as much as 8 percent of the total available is used as livestock or 
poultry feed. 
Since the 1980s, the subsidy benefits have been about equally distributed across 
the population. In this sense the food subsidy is not well targeted even though it may be 
perceived as one of the most effective means of alleviating poverty in Egypt. The bread 
subsidy has been cited as particularly effective in rural areas where it has helped 11   25
percent of the poor out of poverty, owing to the fact that bread is a basic source of 
nutrition for this group, accounting for 27 percent of their total caloric needs.
9 
Nonetheless, the system remains blunt in its targeting, and expensive to operate.  
Leakages from the system into the black market are significant – 28 percent for flour, 20 
percent for sugar, and 15 percent for cooking oil – and the costs of transferring LE 1 of 
income to the needy often costs the government more than three times that amount 
(Ahmed et al. 2001).  
Bread policy presents a political economy dilemma for the GOE. Currently, for 
example, the GOE provides 6 million tons of wheat for bread made available on the street 
at 5 PT per loaf, which is just 30 percent of the true wheat input cost. One third of the 
wheat is procured from local production by the Ministry of Supply and Home Trade 
(MSHT), and the rest is imported by the General Authority for Supply Commodities 
(GASC). Since the imported wheat is bought at international prices, and with the recent 
depreciation of the pound, this along with price supports generates a subsidy cost on the 
order of LE 9 billion, or almost 2 percent of GDP. 
The cost of the other food subsidies is less severe. Access to subsidized sugar and 
edible oil is rationed monthly, at half a kilogram and one kilogram, respectively. While 
some receive a full subsidy (green cards), others receive only a partial subsidy (red cards) 
or no subsidy at all. The coverage of ration cards has been reduced modestly from 79 
percent of the population in 1994 to 63 percent in 2004, when about 40 million 
individuals were covered by the green cards and about 6 million by the red cards. Table 3 
reports on total food subsidies in recent years, where the dominance of the bread subsidy 
is clear.  
 
 
Impact on rural incomes  
 
 
The agricultural reforms undertaken in Egypt over the last two decades have been broad 
and deep. Essentially, the agricultural sector has been converted from an almost totally 
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centrally planned economy to a fairly wide-open free market economy. Since the earlier 
administration model entailed using agriculture as a source of forced savings to subsidize 
the urban consumer and industrialization, this reform should have resulted in increased 
rural prosperity as farm-gate prices were allowed to rise.  
However, the link between rural incomes and reform is not straight-forward. 
Rural income is generated from owner-worked farms, hired labor, tenant farmers, and 
non-farm wages. Currently in rural Egypt, wage employment makes up the largest part of 
household income, about 43 percent, and explicit agricultural income constitutes about 29 
percent. Of the remainder, transfers are the most important at 17 percent. The value 
added in primary agriculture depends on both primary goods output prices and on input 
prices, including especially land, water, fertilizer and pest control. Also, the cost of food 
is a very large component of real income. 
Relative to the pre-reform period 1980-86, Rady, Omran, and Sands (1996) 
calculate that the agricultural resource income available to labor and other inputs from 
eleven crops, including the five crops of focus here, rose by 22 percent in the reform era 
of 1987-94. While the reduction of input subsidies hurt somewhat (income fell in 1991), 
the increases in efficiency, higher prices, and improved incentives allowed the same 
resources to generate over 20 percent more income. Rady, Omran, and Sands observe that 
“these are precisely the kinds of gains that justify the political risks that policy decision 
makers confronted when formulating the reforms.” 
The impact of reform on income distribution and poverty is more complicated.  A 
number of studies have attempted to assess the issues using household-expenditure 
survey data obtained from the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics 
(CAPMAS) and other data assembled by the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI). Food, especially grains and high-carbohydrate items, dominate household 
expenditure in both rural and urban areas of Egypt, representing about 50 percent of 
expenditures on average and 70 percent for the poor. So the impact of more expensive 
food due either to higher farmgate prices or reduced food subsidies is potentially 
enormous. Datt and Olmstead (1998) infer that real wages declined substantially in 
response to food price increases, and imply that the increases in the prices of food crops 
in the context of ERSAP most probably has led to a decline in rural real incomes.    27
Siam (2005) reports a similar finding, noting that while the agricultural wage in 
money terms increased significantly in the 1990s, this was not reflected by living 
standards in the rural sector because the cost of living increased by more than the wage. 
According to El Helepy (2004), the ratio between the indices of agricultural wage and 
rural cost of living decreased from 1.1 in the periods 1974-81 (before reform) and 1982-
1991 (during reform) to 0.7 in the period 1992-2002 (after reform). This may be 
explained substantially by the effect of the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment 
Program (ERSAP) under which farm prices increased by more than agricultural wages, 
and noting that labor wages contribute a significant part of farm incomes, particularly for 
the majority of small farmers where it is as much as 70 percent. The ratio between the 
agricultural wage and non-agricultural wage decreased to 0.18 in 1992-2002, down from 
0.26 in 1982-1991 and 0.29 in the pre-reform era of 1974-81 (El Helepy 2004). This may 
account for some of the labor migration out of agriculture. Also, land reform led to some 
poor households being pushed out of agriculture and into informal wage employment and 
the livestock rearing sector. 
Comparing the pre-reform years 1981/82 with the post-reform years 1990/91, 
IFPRI (1994) concludes that poverty increased slightly in urban areas and may have 
increased in rural areas, depending on the particular income level used to measure 
poverty. If all food subsidies were to have been removed in 1990/91, the poor would have 
required income increases of 17 percent just to maintain the same welfare level. Since 
poverty is generally higher in some politically sensitive areas of the rural Delta, it is 
understandable that policy reform has been marked by cautious gradualism. Lofgren and 
El-Said (1999) estimate that the benefits of eliminating the sugar and edible oil subsidies 
would be small while the negative impact would be quite regressive. Gutner (1999) has 
proposed more politically palatable targeted food subsidy reforms that would reduce 
access of the wealthy. 
 
 
What about future policies? 
 
   28
From 2000 to 2003, real incomes in Egypt stagnated, unemployment rose and inflation 
approached 16 percent. In 2004, the pro-reform cabinet led by Prime Minister Ahmed 
Nazif was appointed, and reappointed in 2005, with a mandate to bolster private sector 
activity through policy reforms. Recently, import tariffs and income taxes have been 
reduced, and plans are in place to privatize most state enterprises and to restructure the 
financial sector. Feedback is positive as real GDP growth has increased, inflation has 
fallen, real interest rates are now positive, and investors have reappeared. Moreover, 
foreign exchange earnings are strong, led by the energy sector, tourism, Suez Canal 
revenues, and worker remittances. 
These recent reforms and the programs announced, particularly the import tariff 
reductions and commitment to a flexible exchange rate, should work to reduce the 
remaining indirect disincentives to primary agricultural production. According to our 
NRA calculations, the remaining direct disincentives in farming are not large following 
the substantial reforms of the last decade. However, milk and the exportables, cotton and 
rice, continue to suffer negative assistance. And food subsidies, especially for bread and 
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Figure 1: Product shares of agricultural output, Egypt, 1955 to 2005 
 


































Source: Authors’ spreadsheet Figure 2: Nominal rates of assistance to exportables, import-competing and all agricultural 





























Figure 3: Nominal rates of assistance to all nonagricultural tradables, all agricultural tradable 
industries, and relative rates of assistance


















RRA agricultural tradables nonagricultural tradables
 
 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors, respectively. 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
 








    1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
            
NRA, Exportables 
a  -31.5 -52.4 -62.4 -62.2 -43.4 -34.0  5.0 -30.9 -17.8 -29.7 
Rice  -64.4 -62.4 -57.4 -48.5 -22.6 -19.6  52.4 -11.9 -18.2 -24.6 
Cotton  -21.6 -50.0 -64.0 -64.9 -49.9 -38.7 -13.6 -40.2 -14.5 -36.7 
            
NRA, Import-competing products
a  -34.3 -44.0 -44.6 -44.4  -5.5  -2.5 138.2  2.4  16.9  -0.8 
Wheat  -40.8 -48.5 -34.2 -30.0 -12.7 -31.5 129.2  47.5  29.6  1.7 
Maize  -32.1  -35.5  -31.8  -22.4 23.6 13.2  237.4 31.1 23.1 12.1 
Sugar  -26.9 -52.8 -34.7 -59.3 -26.6  -8.9  81.6 -24.4  -5.4  13.0 
Meat  -13.4 -32.6 -49.9 -48.0  12.3  26.5 156.2 -11.2  34.5  0.7 
Milk  -68.1 -57.1 -50.6 -43.1 -28.8 -43.9  57.4 -15.6 -19.5 -22.2 
            
NRA, Total of covered products
a  -33.1 -48.1 -53.6 -53.0 -23.2 -13.3  87.3  -9.1  5.9  -9.2 
Dispersion of covered product NRAs
b    21.9 14.7 17.1 21.3 32.2 31.9 89.6 33.0 28.7 22.1 
%  coverage  (at  undistorted  prices)  70 71 70 71 69 68 65 67 67 66 
            
CTE, Total of covered products
c  na -51 -49 -50 -21 -13 108  -3  13  -2 
    of which  wheat  flour  -76 -79 -73 -72 -65 -72  -4 -36 -44 -56 
 
a. Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production.  
b. Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean of NRAs of covered products.  
c. Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of consumption. 




Table 2: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to nonagricultural industries, Egypt, 1955 to 2004 
(percent) 
    1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Covered  products  -33.1 -48.1 -53.6 -53.0 -23.2 -13.3  87.3  -9.1  5.9  -9.2 
Non-covered  products    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
All  agricultural  products  -23.2 -33.9 -37.7 -37.5 -15.9  -9.2  56.6  -6.1  4.0  -6.1 
Non-product  specific  (NPS)  assistance    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total agricultural NRA (incl. NPS)
a  -23.2 -33.9 -37.7 -37.5 -15.9  -9.2  56.6  -6.1  4.0  -6.1 
Trade bias index
b  0.05 -0.15 -0.32 -0.31 -0.39 -0.28 -0.55 -0.32 -0.29 -0.28 
            
Assistance to just tradables:            
      All  agricultural  tradables  -33.1 -48.1 -53.6 -53.0 -23.2 -13.3  87.3  -9.1  5.9  -9.2 
      All  non-agricultural  tradables  5.7 7.7 8.1 7.5 4.4 3.7 4.5 5.3 5.1 5.4 
Relative rate of assistance, RRA
c  -36.7 -51.8 -57.1 -56.3 -26.4 -16.4  79.3 -13.6  0.7 -13.8 
            
            
            
            
            
 
a. NRAs including product-specific input subsidies and non-product-specific (NPS) assistance. Total of assistance to primary factors and 
intermediate inputs divided to total value of primary agriculture production at undistorted prices (percent). 
b. Trade bias index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the 
import-competing and exportable parts of the agricultural sector. 




t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
 








Year  Sugar Oil  Baladi  bread  Total 
1990/91 500  368  1255  2123 
1991/92 675  586  1057  2318 
1992/93 597  500  1308  2405 
1993/94 464  471  1424  2359 
1994/95 464  473  1486  2423 
1995/96 466  479  2185  3130 
1996/97 635  520  2307  3462 
1997/98 511  497  2380  3388 
1998/99 530  400  2460  3390 
1999/00 449  657  2561  3667 
2000/01 523  798  2744  6465 
2001/02 577  719  2950  4246 
2002/03 546  614  3009  4169 
2003/04 609  854  3201  4664 
2004/05 634  1283  7123  8051 
2005/06 609  1570  8442 10622 
 
Source: Ministry of Supply and Home Trade 










Production and consumption data are from the Ministry of Agriculture and Land 
Reclamation (MALR) - Sector of Economic Affairs. Some of these data are shared with 





We used MALR data and margins for both seed and lint.  The lint price was on average 
2.17 times above the wholesale price for seed and with a fairly low variance, although the 
margin ranged from 2.7 in the early years to 1.7 in the later years.  This is roughly 
consistent with reported data for Zambia and a bit higher than for Tanzania. (Note that 
the conversion from seed to lint is about .33, although there are some bi-products such as 
cottonseed and oil which have value. Specifically, one seed cotton kentar produces 50 kg 
of cotton lint, 150 kg of cotton seed, 2 kg of scarto and 0.5 kg of dust. (1 kg = 2.2075 
lb).)  Our seed prices coincide with Dethier and the FAO where the series overlap.  Our 
lint prices are consistently lower than the FAO producer price series, which averaged 2.9 
times higher than the seed price versus our 2.17 average. The series tracked each other 
reasonably closely in terms of fluctuations in price, but in the later years our lint series is 
as much as 25 percent below the FAO lint series. 
  For border prices we used 1961-2005 FAO unit values which coincided with 
prices reported by MALR-Sector of Economic Affairs. For 1955-60 we used World Bank 
(AINDEX) w/ freight factors inferred as follows:[(FAO unit values 1961-63) minus (WB 
int'l prices)]/3. 
  Our prices for the early 1960s were close to those reported in Hansen and 
Nashashibi (1974) when adjusted for our exchange rate assumptions.  This was also the 
case for rice, maize, wheat, and sugar. 
 
Rice 
We used MALR data and margins for both paddy rice and rice.  The paddy price was 
very close to Dethier and to the FAO series where the series coincided.  Our wholesale 
price is about in line with the .67 conversion rate of paddy to rice. 
  For the border prices we used 1961-2005 FAO unit values. For 1955-60 we used 
MALR series based on World Bank (Bangkok). 
 
Maize and wheat 
We used MALR-Sector of Economic Affairs data. Our prices tracked both Dethier’s and 
the FAO producer prices closely, but ours were just a bit higher. 
  For border prices we used FAO 1961 on; for 1955-60 we inferred transport costs 
using WB and MALR data (EPP sheet) and later FAO-WB differences to calculate the 






Our sugar cane prices and margins are from the MALR- Sector of Economic Affairs. 
These prices track closely but almost 30 percent higher the Dethier and FAO series, 
which coincide almost. We constructed the processed sugar prices from MALR- Sector 
of Economic Affairs. This series seems reasonable based on the 0.10 conversion of cane 
to sugar and using the FAO cane prices as a reference. Our cane prices seem a bit high 
relative to our sugar prices. 
  For border prices we used FAO unit values 1961-2005; 1955-60 was constructed 
from EPP-MALR-sector of economic affairs (attached here as sheet 1) using the 4 year 
average difference between FAO and WB series 1961-64 to infer transport margins for 
1955-60. Data showed no imports for 1971 and 1973, so we extrapolated in between 
nearest years in the series (1970, 1972, 1974). 
 
Milk 
We took the farmgate price data (MALR-Sector of Economic Affairs) and added a 20 
percent margin for the wholesale price. Our series is close to the FAO producer prices in 
the 1960s and 1970s, but diverges lower by almost 50 percent in the 1990s. 
  For border prices we used FAO unit values (milk equivalents), which were close 
to the New Zealand milk prices plus 25 percent used in the Ecuador spreadsheet. (Our 
prices were a bit higher.) 
 
Meat 
We used FAOSTAT producer prices for 1967-2003, with 2004-5 prices set at 2003 
prices; for 1955-1966 we took .95 of each succeeding year. This series is close to the 
MALR series on producer prices and wholesale prices where MALR data is available 
(1991-2005 for one series or the other). 
  For border prices we used WB beef data (World Bank 2006) plus a 25 percent 
margin (following the Ecuador transport margin). For 1955-60 we used backward moving 
averages. This series of prices exceeded the FAO unit values for bovine meat imports, but 
imports were sporadic and the FAO series seemed unstable relative to the WB series and 
the Ecuador “dressed carcass weight price” series. We compared this series with a 




Official exchange rates are from IMF (2006 and earlier years). Parallel exchange rates are 
assumed to be the black market rates in Easterly (2006). One concern was the outlier 
black market rate reported for 1985. (Pick’s reported a much more uniform rate for that 
year.) We tried smoothing out the 1985 outlier and it did not essentially change our 
calculations, so in the end we used the outlier since it was reported as part of the series 
and that was indeed a turbulent time for Egyptian foreign exchange markets. 
 
Taxes and subsidies on production, consumption, input and trade  
 












































Appendix Figure 2: Composition of merchandise trade, Egypt, 1965 to 2004 
(percent) 
 















































  Appendix Figure 3: Currency exchange rate and inflation rate, Egypt, 1960 to 2004 















Source:  IMF (2006) and Cowitt (various years) 
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Appendix Table 2: Prices and NRAs for primary products, Egypt, 1960 to 2005   
Maize Wheat Sugar 
NRA =  NRA =  NRA = 



















MT  BP 
1960  19 23  -0.19 20 33  -0.40  30  43  -0.30 
1961  21 37  -0.42 22 40  -0.45  31  53  -0.42 
1962  23 37  -0.37 24 52  -0.53  32  49  -0.35 
1963  26 42  -0.38 27 55  -0.50  33  157  -0.79 
1964  29 49  -0.40 30 66  -0.54  34  161  -0.79 
1965  28 54  -0.47 31 57  -0.46  39  138  -0.71 
1966  34 51  -0.34 34 56  -0.40  37  75  -0.51 
1967  38 44  -0.13 38 50  -0.23  40  44  -0.11 
1968  31 45  -0.32 33 48  -0.30  40  50  -0.21 
1969  35 51  -0.33 34 50  -0.32  40  49  -0.19 
1970  35 48  -0.26 40 45  -0.11  37  74  -0.50 
1971  35 51  -0.31 37 55  -0.32  37  86  -0.57 
1972  40 43  -0.08 37 49  -0.24  40  90  -0.56 
1973  49 61  -0.19 40 62  -0.35  41  111  -0.63 
1974  56 78  -0.28 49 95  -0.48  71  241  -0.71 
1975  57 65  -0.13 54 80  -0.32  81  241  -0.66 
1976  57 68  -0.15 50 64  -0.22  91  136  -0.33 
1977 84  51  0.64  57 55  0.05  91  99  -0.08 
1978 80  53  0.52  65 55  0.18 101  105  -0.04 
1979 84  64  0.31  68 100  -0.32  136  173  -0.21 
1980 134  122  0.10  92 136  -0.32  136  338  -0.60 
1981 106  177  -0.40  97 180  -0.46  171  449  -0.62 
1982 138  172  -0.20  87 181  -0.52  193  214  -0.10 
1983 182  100  0.81  116  153 -0.24  213  166 0.28 
1984 188  139  0.35  131  135 -0.03  253  160 0.59 
1985 210  190  0.11  179  226 -0.21  253  239 0.06 
1986 236  85  1.78  232  97 1.39  316 207  0.52 
1987 273  56  3.86  232  75 2.07  351 130  1.70 
1988  343 76 3.50 247 109  1.28  400  203  0.97 
1989  425 117 2.62  450 153  1.93  511  280  0.82 
1990  448 310 0.44  490 374  0.31  591  920  -0.36 
1991  463 289 0.60  515 240  1.15  591  693  -0.15 
1992  458 416 0.10  545 453  0.20  671  1038  -0.35 
1993  482 382 0.26  548 420  0.31  741  937  -0.21 
1994  504 441 0.14  553 393  0.41  821  971  -0.15 
1995  540 488 0.11  581 587  -0.01  911  1262  -0.28 
1996  564 608  -0.07 662 709  -0.07  961  1139  -0.16 
1997  580 429 0.35  689 406  0.70  961  1176  -0.18 
1998  608 433 0.40  707 510  0.39  961  871  0.10 
1999  635 465 0.36  718 487  0.47  961  772  0.24 
2000  638 445 0.43  725 565  0.28  961  603  0.59 
2001  645 521 0.24  736 684  0.08 1061  801  0.33 
2002  662 756  -0.12 754 884  -0.15 1061  1322  -0.20 




2004  1071 923 0.16  1036 1025  0.01  1311 1263  0.04 
2005  1072 733 0.46  1156 906  0.28  1311 1675 -0.22 




Cotton Rice   
NRA =  NRA =   













MT  BP   
1960  226 350  -0.35 23 50  -0.54   
1961  221 494  -0.55 25 61  -0.58   
1962  257 474  -0.46 28 81  -0.65   
1963  240 545  -0.56 31 82  -0.62   
1964  230 541  -0.58 35 95  -0.63   
1965  203 621  -0.67 40 103  -0.61   
1966  202 600  -0.66 49 109  -0.55   
1967  231 517  -0.55 55 106  -0.48   
1968  242 614  -0.61 56 130  -0.57   
1969  222 758  -0.71 59 129  -0.54   
1970  272 754  -0.64 56 93  -0.40   
1971  270 735  -0.63 57 82  -0.30   
1972  301 688  -0.56 59 74  -0.21   
1973  266 883  -0.70 63 141  -0.55   
1974  311 1083  -0.71  78 322  -0.76   
1975  348 874  -0.60 87 228  -0.62   
1976  450 757  -0.41 104 145  -0.29   
1977 483  1025  -0.53  116 104  0.12   
1978 500  808  -0.38  132 137  -0.04   
1979 622  1473  -0.58  133 230  -0.42   
1980 645  1460  -0.56  156 249  -0.37   
1981 787  1498  -0.47  184 327  -0.44   
1982 808  1212  -0.33  232 369  -0.37   
1983 924  1168  -0.21  234  252 -0.07   
1984 971  1519  -0.36  236  212 0.11   
1985 1286  2972  -0.57  360  405 -0.11   
1986 1369  1741  -0.21  414  282 0.47   
1987 1660  1563  0.06  353  252 0.40   
1988  2133 1992 0.07  430 168  1.56   
1989  2917 3014  -0.03  591 198  1.99   
1990  3595 8929  -0.60  453 557  -0.19   
1991  4330 8060  -0.46  706 542  0.30   
1992  4981 9132  -0.45  731 1011  -0.28   
1993  4756 6478  -0.27  812 931  -0.13   
1994  4305 5583  -0.23  966 1057  -0.09   
1995  7458 6123 0.22  1048 1202  -0.13   
1996  6917 10890  -0.36  1120 1215  -0.08   
1997  7549 7190 0.05  1148 1176  -0.02   
1998  4858 6470  -0.25 1160 1046  0.11   
1999  3604 5817  -0.38 1175 952  0.23   
2000  4133 6477  -0.36  959 1086  -0.12   
2001  4097 8242  -0.50  979 904  0.08   






2003  8296 9205  -0.10 1581 1553  0.02   
2004  8205 12924  -0.37  1633 1671  -0.02   
2005  7813 9903  -0.21 1701 1978  -0.14   
           
           
Milk Meat   
NRA =  NRA =   













MT  BP   
1960  23 54  -0.57  349 434  -0.20   
1961  26 96  -0.73  368 517  -0.29   
1962  29 76  -0.63  387 637  -0.39   
1963  32 70  -0.55  408 591  -0.31   
1964  35 56  -0.37  429 771  -0.44   
1965  36 98  -0.63  452 839  -0.46   
1966  39 70  -0.44  475 1016  -0.53   
1967  45 78  -0.42  500 892  -0.44   
1968  39 87  -0.55  509 995  -0.49   
1969  39 76  -0.48  520 1218  -0.57   
1970  46 78  -0.40  534 1289  -0.59   
1971  42 78  -0.45  531 1280  -0.59   
1972  42 96  -0.56  588 1260  -0.53   
1973  46 101  -0.55  664 1633  -0.59   
1974  56 69  -0.19  784 872  -0.10   
1975  62 73  -0.16  812 652  0.24   
1976  57 78  -0.28  931 781  0.19   
1977 65  82  -0.21  1092 745  0.47   
1978 74  115  -0.36  1233 1067  0.15   
1979 77  137  -0.44  1425 2549  -0.44   
1980 106  161  -0.34  1791 2439  -0.27   
1981 110  211  -0.48  1846 2250  -0.18   
1982 98  276  -0.64  2500 2217  0.13   
1983 132  238  -0.45  3500  2108 0.66   
1984 149  208  -0.28  3833  1935 0.98   
1985 206  369  -0.44  4500  3367 0.34   
1986 270  225  0.20  5500  1880 1.93   
1987 268  136  0.97  5933  1947 2.05   
1988  285 141  1.02 6267 2182  1.87   
1989  524 247  1.12 6763 2574  1.63   
1990  568 601  -0.05  6853 7579  -0.10   
1991  598 574  0.04 7425 7177  0.03   
1992  632 888  -0.29  7583 10359  -0.27   
1993  635 849  -0.25  9009 11181  -0.19   
1994  640 825  -0.22  9497 9881  -0.04   
1995  672 939  -0.28  10052 8081 0.24   
1996  768 1040  -0.26  10393 7704 0.35   
1997  797 969  -0.18  10583 7906 0.34   
1998  816 964  -0.15  10380 7308 0.42   
1999  826 915  -0.10  10760 7846 0.37   




2001  841 1050  -0.20  12200 12031 0.01   
2002  862 1305  -0.34  14318 15873 -0.10   
2003  912 1212  -0.25  16485 15318 0.08   
2004  1200 1492  -0.20 16485 19300 -0.15   
2005  1344 1408  -0.05 16485 18973 -0.13   
           
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet using methodology from Anderson et al. (2008) 


































Estimated equilibrium exchange rate 
using this study’s methodology 
b 
1960  0.350  0.512 0.5  0.471 
1961  0.350  0.692 0.5  0.606 
1962  0.435  0.806 0.5  0.714 
1963  0.435  0.800 0.5  0.709 
1964  0.435  0.833 0.5  0.734 
1965  0.435  0.870 0.5  0.761 
1966  0.435  0.909 0.5  0.791 
1967  0.435  0.769 0.5  0.686 
1968  0.435  0.833 0.5  0.734 
1969  0.435  0.917 0.5  0.797 
1970  0.435  0.909 0.5  0.791 
1971  0.435  0.870 0.5  0.761 
1972 0.435  0.763  0.5  0.681 
1973 0.435  0.721  0.5  0.650 
1974 0.391  0.458  0.5  0.441 
1975 0.391  0.394  0.5  0.393 
1976 0.391  0.397  0.5  0.395 
1977 0.391  0.397  0.5  0.396 
1978 0.391  0.402  0.5  0.399 
1979 0.700  0.709  0.5  0.707 
1980 0.700  0.709  0.5  0.707 
1981 0.700  0.737  0.5  0.728 
1982 0.700  0.756  0.5  0.742 
1983 0.700  0.688  0.5  0.691 
1984 0.700  0.675  0.5  0.681 
1985 0.700  1.434  0.5  1.250 
1986 0.700  0.725  0.5  0.719 
1987 0.700  0.637  0.5  0.653 
1988 0.700  0.691  0.5  0.693 
1989 0.867  0.780  0.5  0.802 
1990 1.550  2.637  0.5  2.365 
1991 2.000  2.208  0.5  2.156 
1992 3.339  3.389  0.5  3.376 
1993 3.372  3.432  0.5  3.417 
1994  3.391  3.391 0.5  3.391 
1995  3.390  3.390 0.5  3.390 
1996  3.388  3.474 0.5  3.452 
1997  3.388  3.414 0.5  3.408 
1998  3.388  3.388 0.5  3.388 
1999  3.405  3.405 0.5  3.405 
2000  3.870  3.870 0.5  3.870 
2001  4.520  4.520  0.5  4.520 
2002  6.033  6.033  0.5  6.033 
2003  6.190  6.190  0.5  6.190 
2004  6.145  6.145  0.5  6.145 
2005  5.800  5.800  0.5  5.800 




Appendix Table 4: Annual distortion estimates, Egypt, 1955 to 2005 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products  (percent) 
   Beef  Cotton  Maize  Milk  Rice  Sugar  Wheat 
All 
covered  
1955 -21 -21 -45 -77 -71 -34 -49 -39 
1956 -17 -21 -39 -75 -68 -31 -45 -37 
1957 -14 -22 -32 -70 -64 -29 -41 -34 
1958  -8 -22 -25 -64 -60 -23 -37 -29 
1959  -7 -22 -19 -55 -58 -18 -32 -27 
1960 -20 -35 -19 -57 -56 -30 -40 -35 
1961 -29 -55 -42 -73 -60 -42 -45 -51 
1962 -39 -46 -37 -63 -67 -35 -53 -48 
1963 -31 -56 -38 -55 -64 -79 -50 -52 
1964 -44 -58 -40 -37 -65 -79 -54 -54 
1965 -46 -67 -47 -63 -62 -71 -46 -59 
1966 -53 -66 -34 -44 -56 -51 -40 -55 
1967 -44 -55 -13 -42 -51 -11 -23 -43 
1968 -49 -61 -32 -55 -60 -21 -30 -52 
1969 -57 -71 -33 -48 -58 -19 -32 -59 
1970 -59 -64 -26 -40 -32 -50 -11 -51 
1971 -59 -63 -31 -45 -39 -57 -32 -54 
1972 -53 -56  -8 -56 -33 -56 -24 -48 
1973 -59 -70 -19 -55 -62 -63 -35 -58 
1974 -10 -71 -28 -19 -77 -71 -48 -55 
1975  24 -60 -13 -16 -64 -66 -32 -39 
1976  19 -41 -15 -28 -27 -33 -22 -22 
1977  47 -53  64 -21  16  -8  5  -7 
1978  15 -38  52 -36  3  -4  18  -6 
1979 -44 -58  31 -44 -42 -21 -32 -42 
1980 -27 -56  10 -34 -35 -60 -32 -36 
1981 -18 -47 -40 -48 -37 -62 -46 -41 
1982  13 -33 -20 -64 -36 -10 -52 -26 
1983 66  -21 81  -45  -11 28  -24 14 
1984 98  -36 35  -28 21 59 -3 22 
1985  34 -57  11 -44  -8  6 -21 -15 
1986  193  -21  178 20 10 52  139 68 
1987 205  6 386  97  15 170 207 127 
1988 187  7 350 102 103  97 128 132 
1989 163  -3 262 112 142  82 193 125 
1990 -10 -60  44  -5 -26 -36  31 -15 
1991 3  -46  60 4  19  -15  115 8 
1992 -27 -45  10 -29 -20 -35  20 -22 
1993 -19 -27  26 -25 -15 -21  31 -11 
1994  -4 -23  14 -22 -19 -15  41  -5 
1995 24 22 11  -28  -24  -28 -1 -2 
1996  35 -36  -7 -26 -22 -16  -7  -9 
1997  34  5  35 -18 -27 -18  70  10 
1998 42  -25 40  -15  -12 10 39 15 
1999 37  -38 36  -10 -6 24 47 15 
2000  19 -36  43 -13 -31  59  28  5 
2001  1 -50  24 -20 -27  33  8  -9 
2002 -10 -51 -12 -34 -39 -20 -15 -24 
2003  8 -10 -10 -25  -9 -11 -14  -8 
2004 -15 -37  16 -20 -17  4  1 -11 




Appendix Table 4 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Egypt, 1955 to 2005  
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agriculture, to exportable and import-
competing agricultural industries, and relative
b to non-agricultural industries
 (percent) 
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Covered products 














1955 0 -39 0  -27 -34 -43 -39 6  -42
1956 0 -37 0  -26 -33 -40 -37 6  -40
1957 0 -34 0  -24 -32 -35 -34 6  -37
1958 0 -29 0  -20 -29 -29 -29 6  -33
1959 0 -27 0  -19 -29 -24 -27 6  -31
1960 0 -35 0  -25 -39 -32 -35 7  -40
1961 0 -51 0  -36 -56 -47 -51 8  -54
1962 0 -48 0  -34 -51 -46 -48 8  -52
1963 0 -52 0  -36 -58 -46 -52 8  -55
1964 0 -54 0  -38 -59 -49 -54 8  -57
1965 0 -59 0  -41 -66 -52 -59 8  -62
1966 0 -55 0  -38 -64 -46 -55 8  -58
1967 0 -43 0  -31 -54 -34 -43 8  -47
1968 0 -52 0  -37 -60 -44 -52 8  -56
1969 0 -59 0  -42 -68 -48 -59 8  -62
1970 0 -51 0  -37 -58 -45 -51 8  -55
1971 0 -54 0  -38 -60 -49 -54 8  -57
1972 0 -48 0  -34 -52 -45 -48 8  -51
1973 0 -58 0  -41 -68 -50 -58 7  -61
1974 0 -55 0  -38 -74 -33 -55 6  -57
1975 0 -39 0  -27 -62 -19 -39 5  -42
1976 0 -22 0  -15 -35 -10 -22 5  -25
1977 0 -7 0 -5 -40 25 -7 4  -11
1978 0 -6 0 -4 -27 9 -6 4  -9
1979 0 -42 0  -28 -54 -32 -42 4  -44
1980 0 -36 0  -25 -51 -26 -36 3  -38
1981 0 -41 0  -28 -45 -39 -41 4  -43
1982 0 -26 0  -17 -34 -22 -26 4  -29
1983 0 14 0  10 -17 29 14 4  10
1984 0 22 0  15 -22 44 22 4  18
1985 0 -15 0  -10 -45 5 -15 5  -19
1986 0 68 0  44 -9 129 68 4  62
1987 0 127 0  81 10 207 127 4  118
1988 0 132 0  86 33 182 132 5  122
1989 0 125 0  82 37 169 125 5  115
1990 0 -15 0  -10 -49 4 -15 7  -21
1991 0 8 0  5 -27 27 8 5  2
1992 0 -22 0  -15 -37 -14 -22 5  -25
1993 0 -11 0 -7 -22 -6 -11 5  -15
1994 0 -5 0 -3 -20 1 -5 5  -9
1995 0 -2 0 -1 -10 2 -2 5  -6
1996 0 -9 0 -6 -29 2 -9 5  -14
1997 0 10 0  7 -16 24 10 5  5
1998 0 15 0  10 -17 27 15 5  10
1999 0 15 0  10 -17 29 15 5  9
2000 0 5 0  4 -33 21 5 5  0
2001 0 -9 0 -6 -39 5 -9 5  -13
2002 0 -24 0  -16 -43 -16 -24 6  -28
2003 0 -8 0 -5 -9 -7 -8 5  -12
2004 0 -11 0 -8 -25 -6 -11 5  -16
2005 0 -4 0 -3 -20 4 -4 0  -4
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 





t are the percentage NRAs for the 




Appendix Table 4 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Egypt, 1955 to 2005 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products,  
(percent) 
 Beef  Cotton  Maize Milk Rice Sugar Wheat 
Non-
covered
1955  16 22  7 9 8 2 5 30
1956  16 22  7 10 8 2 6 30
1957  14 26  6 9 8 2 6 30
1958  13 28  6 8 7 2 6 30
1959  13 29  5 7 7 2 6 30
1960  13 31  5 7 5 2 7 30
1961  13 28  7 11 4 2 7 29
1962  14 26  7 8 8 2 8 29
1963  12 27  6 6 8 5 7 30
1964  13 27  7 4 8 4 7 30
1965  13 30  7 6 7 3 4 31
1966  16 26  8 4 7 2 5 31
1967  18 23  7 6 11 1 5 29
1968  18 22  6 7 13 1 4 28
1969  17 29  6 5 9 1 3 29
1970  21 26  6 6 6 2 4 28
1971  21 26  7 6 4 3 5 29
1972  21 24  6 8 6 3 4 29
1973  20 24  6 6 7 3 5 30
1974  9 23  7 4 15 5 6 30
1975  9 20  7 5 13 8 7 31
1976  11 18  9 6 13 5 6 31
1977  12 28  7 7 7 4 5 31
1978  16 21  7 9 8 4 5 31
1979  20 23  4 6 7 4 4 32
1980  17 21  8 6 6 6 5 31
1981  14 18 10 7 7 7 6 32
1982  15 13 10 9 10 3 7 33
1983  18 13  8 9 8 3 7 33
1984  17 17 11 8 5 3 6 33
1985  16 20  8 8 7 3 5 34
1986  15 18  5 8 11 4 4 35
1987  19 16  5 6 10 3 5 36
1988  21 16  6 5 6 5 6 35
1989  18 16  8 7 6 5 7 34
1990  17 17  7 6 8 5 8 33
1991  19 17  8 6 7 4 6 33
1992  19 15  7 7 8 4 7 33
1993  21 13  7 7 9 4 7 32
1994  21 7 9 7 13 5 6  32
1995  15 6 8 7 14 6 10  35
1996  13 12  9 7 11 4 10 34
1997  17 8 7 8 16 5 7  32
1998  17 6 8 9 12 4 10  32
1999  17 7 8 9 14 4 9  33
2000  19 5 7 8 14 3 10  33
2001  18 10  8 8 10 3 10 34
2002  18 7 8 8 12 4 10  34
2003  19 4 9 9 12 3 11  33
2004  21 7 8 8 11 3 9  33
2005  19 10  6 7 11 4 10 33
a. At farmgate undistorted prices, US$ 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 